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Abstract: Sub-Saharan Africa is home today to some of the most unequal countries in 
the world, in Southern and Central Africa, as well as others that are close to the world 
average, in Western Africa. Yet, there is no consensus regarding the historical factors 
that led to such a situation. Given limited data on income distribution during colonial 
times, we do not know whether present-day inequality patterns can be traced back to the 
colonial period and which role was played by colonial institutions. Most of our 
knowledge comes from information on British colonies, while territories subjected to 
other colonial powers are much less well known. To address this gap, we analyze trends 
in income inequality for colonies in French West Africa, building social tables for 
Senegal and Ivory Coast during the last decades of colonial rule. We find that income 
inequality was high during the colonial period, because of the huge income differential 
between Africans and European settlers (especially in Senegal) and of high inequality 
within the African population (especially in the Ivory Coast). Nevertheless, it tended to 
reduce during colonial rule – but the trend inverted after independence. Our findings 
cast in a new light the connection between colonialism, extractive institutions, high 
inequality and inequality extraction ratios. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Africa is currently one of the most unequal regions in the world. But regional averages hide a 
high heterogeneity of inequality patterns, with Southern Africa being the most unequal area of the 
world and Western Africa being close to the global average. Indeed, Africa is the world region where 
we have the greatest heterogeneity in income inequality across countries Yet there is no general 
consensus about the historical factors that led to this situation. While some argue that sub-Saharan 
African societies became unequal as a consequence of colonization, others suggest that they were 
characterized by relatively very high inequality also in earlier epochs. This might still be due to contact 
with the Europeans through the slave trade, but in such case colonialism played at most a secondary 
role in enrooting inequality as well as under-development (for a synthesis of the debate, Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2010; Bolt and Hillbom 2016)   
A quickly-expanding, recent literature on African economic history has gone a long way 
towards providing better estimates of key economic variables, like per-capita GDP, for many 
parts of the continent. Although much remains to be done, these studies are beginning to change 
the very empirical basis upon which discussion of the “African divergence” takes place (Prados 
de la Escosura 2012; Austin and Broadberry 2014; Broadberry and Gardner 2016). Long-term 
distributive dynamics, however, have been relatively neglected by this renaissance in African 
economic history, hence the debate about the origins of high inequality rages on. We aim to 
contribute to such a debate by investigating whether the current high levels of African 
inequality can be traced back to colonial rule. Indeed, extractive institutions established by 
the colonizers in Africa have often been blamed as one of the causes of current 
underdevelopment (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; 
Nunn 2008). In addition, by favoring the interests of European companies and settlers with 
respect to those of the majority of the African population, government institutions are 
frequently thought to have heavily affected the distribution of income and wealth in African 
societies (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Bolt and Hillbom 2016). If similar 
extractive institutions persisted over time, we may be able to identify the roots of current 
inequality by looking at patterns of income distribution during the colonial period. 
The main difficulty in answering these questions is that we have very limited data about 
inequality during colonial rule. The main exceptions are Ghana, for which we have some 
information since 1891 (Aboagye and Bolt 2018), Kenya since 1914 (Bigsten 1987), Botswana 
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since 1921 (Bolt and Hillbom 2016), and Zimbabwe since 1945 (Adelman and Morris 1972). 
If we look at a level below current states, we have some information on income distribution in the 
Dutch Cape Colony between 1700 and 1753 (Fourie and Von Fintel 2011). If we focus on top 
incomes instead of on the full distribution, it is important to cite the work by Atkinson (2014) who 
analysed top incomes in 15 British African colonies from tax records.1 Nevertheless, from this 
review, it is clear that most of our knowledge of inequality during colonial rule refers to British 
colonies in Eastern and Southern Africa.  
The other main colonial empire in Africa, the French, has largely been ignored by recent studies of 
colonial inequality2. We contribute to filling in this gap, by focusing on two colonies in West Africa, 
Senegal and Ivory Coast, from the late 1930s to the 1950s: a crucial period, as it was the run-up to 
independence, gained by both colonies in 1960. There are two main reasons why these are 
particularly important case studies. First, Senegal and Ivory Coast were among the richest and most 
dynamic territories of French Africa, which makes them not only good candidates to study pre-
industrial inequality, but also ensures a relative abundance of historical documentation and 
secondary literature. Second, they are the only two ex-French colonies of Sub-Saharan Africa for 
which we have relatively complete Gini series for the post-independence period, which allows us to 
fully explore the relevance of our findings by placing our own inequality estimates into a long-term 
perspective.  
To reconstruct income distributions, we use the method of social tables. This technique has been 
extensively used by recent literature on modern societies (Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson 2011; 
Milanovic 2018; Allen 2019) as well as on preindustrial (Lindert and Williamson 1983; Lindert 2000; 
Broadberry et al. 2015; Saito 2015; Allen 2019) and even ancient ones (Scheidel and Friesen 2009; 
Milanovic 2017). Social tables have also been employed to study distribution in African societies 
in periods close to the one we focus on (e.g. Bolt and Hillbom 2016; Aboagye and Bolt 2018). 
Social tables allow us to estimate overall inequality by dividing the society into a range of properly-
defined classes, for each of whom population size and average income must be known. To 
implement this methodology, we collected new data from colonial statistical publications, 
qualitative sources, and anthropological records. This approach allows us to shed light on several 
                                                 
1 Some other studies focus on wealth inequality, for example Galli and Rönnbäck (2019) and Galli (2019) on Sierra Leone in 
1831 and Fourie and Von Fintel (2010) on the Cape Colony (South Africa) in 1663-1757. For a synthesis of earlier works on 
wealth/land inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa as well as for additional insights, see Frankema (2010). 
2 A notable exception is the work by Alvaredo, Cogneau, and Piketty (2016), who report information on income inequality 
from tax records in Algeria, Tunisia, and Cameroon between 1920 and 1960. 
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questions. What was the overall level of inequality during the colonial period? What were its main 
drivers? Did inequality patterns change after independence? Moreover, reconstructing social tables 
not only helps us to understand inequality, but provides us with new information on famers’ 
standards of livings, which are notably difficult to measure (De Haas 2016), on role and composition 
of African rural elites, wage levels, and poverty rates. Finally, we produced new population 
estimates at the local level, which could prove useful to scholars interested in African development 
in the long run. 
Overall, our results show that income inequality in colonial Senegal and Ivory Coast was very high 
(although for partly different reasons). Nevertheless, over time income inequality tended to decrease 
with a trend starting before independence, casting doubts on simple explanations linking high 
inequality to colonial extractive institutions – especially considering that the declining trend in 
inequality tended to invert immediately after independence. However, colonial institutions might 
have had a different impact on distribution, not by leading to higher inequality levels, but to higher 
inequality extraction ratios – i.e., by making colonial societies as unequal as they could have been. 
This method of analysis, recently introduced by Branko Milanovic (Milanovic 2013; 2018; 
Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson 2011) allowed us to dig deeper into the historical evidence – 
indeed, contributing to reinforce the idea that maybe the colonial period was not the point of origin 
of high inequality in Africa. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of French colonization in 
sub-Saharan Africa and offers some key information about Senegal and Ivory Coast. Section 3 
begins by providing some general data on inequality in sub-Saharan Africa in a global perspective, 
thereafter it discusses the method of social tables and applies it to our case study. Section 4 analyzes 
the results by presenting Gini indexes and discussing potential explanations for inequality patterns. 
Section 5 places the results in a longer time frame and further discusses them by looking at inequality 
extraction ratios. Section 6 provides concluding remarks and directions for future research. 
 
2. The French colonization of Sub-Saharan Africa: the case of Senegal and Ivory Coast  
 
The French colonized large parts of Africa between the mid-1800s and 1960, starting from a few 
bases established much earlier (for example in Senegal, the first French settlement was the port city 
of Saint-Louis, founded in 1659). In West Africa, they controlled the territories corresponding to 
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current Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Benin, and Togo.3  
Senegal and Ivory Coast were two of the richest territories of French West Africa. Scarcely 
populated (2-3 million people overall), their economic structure was based on agriculture and most 
colonial activity relied on buying agricultural goods in Africa and reselling it at higher prices in 
Europe. A small number of large trading companies monopolized commerce and had great influence 
in determining the prices that the African producers could receive (Tadei 2018, 2019). Most 
agricultural production was in the hands of African farmers and if in some cases European settlers 
established plantations, this remained a small proportion of total production, the Europeans 
accounting for a tiny percentage of the population.  Important productions were peanuts and millet 
in Senegal, yams and cocoa in Ivory Coast. 
Forced labor practices were widespread: the inhabitants of French West Africa were compelled to 
work for a fixed number of days every year, for the colonial government until 1946 and for private 
enterprises at least until the ratification by France in 1937 of the 1930 International Labor 
Organization Convention, which focused on abolishing forced labor (Fall 1993). The colonial power 
invested very little in public goods. On average, between 1907 and 1956 there were only 1,000 
teachers, 1,400 doctors and 300 schools serving the entire territory of French West Africa (Huillery 
2014). After the Second World War, under political pressure in the colonies and in France, the 
colonial system began to change. Forced labor was abolished, investments in public goods 
increased, and forms of political representation of Africans were established. 
The two colonies obtained formal independence in 1960. The process leading to this change was 
generally peaceful, but did not necessarily lead to democratic regimes. In Ivory Coast the rule of 
Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993) and Henri Konan Bédié (1993-1999) guaranteed a certain 
stability to the country until the late 1990s. After that, Ivory Coast experienced a long period of 
political instability, brought about by General Guéï’s coup in 1999 and the two civil wars during 
Laurent Gbagbo’s government, in 2002-2007 and 2010-2011 (Daddieh 2016). Senegal’s post-
colonial period, on the contrary, was characterized by peaceful political transitions. The only 
attempted coup in 1962 was repressed without bloodshed. Yet, in the almost 60 years since 
independence, Senegal had only four presidents: Leopold Senghor from 1960 to 1980 (with one 
legal party only from 1965 to 1975), Abdou Diouf from 1981 to 2000, Abdoulaye Wade from 2000 
to 2012, and Macky Sall thereafter (Clark and Philips 1994). 
                                                 
3 The historical background of this section relies on Coquery-Vidrovitch (1972), Duignan and Gahan (1975), Hopkins 
(1973), Manning (1998),  and Suret-Canale (1971). 
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3. Constructing Social Tables for French West Africa 
 
According to United Nations estimates, the average Gini index for Sub-Saharan African 
countries is 0.43, while the world average is 0.39. Even compared with other developing regions, 
Africa’s inequality is stark: Asian and Middle-Eastern countries’ inequality is lower than the world 
average and only Latin America presents levels of inequality that are similar to those we find 
in Sub-Saharan-Africa (see table 1). Moreover, it is in Africa that we have the largest heterogeneity 
in income inequality across countries, as shown by the largest coefficient of variation among all 
world regions. This diversity of experiences makes Africa an ideal laboratory to study patterns of 
inequality and the differential impact of colonial rule. However, for the pre-1950 period we have 
Gini estimates for just four sub-African countries: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. 
The situation can be grasped from Figure 1, which reports the scatter-plot of Gini indexes over 
time for all countries and years included in the last version of the UNU-WIDER database 
(December 2018). Each point represents a country/year. The contrast between the wealth of 
information available before and after independence is clear.  
 
Table 1. Gini in World Regions, 2008-2017 
  average st. dev. coeff. variation min max # countries 
East Asia and the Pacific 0.38 0.05 0.13 0.29 0.48 27 
Europe and Central Asia 0.33 0.04 0.12 0.25 0.41 46 
Latin America & the Caribbean 0.47 0.04 0.09 0.38 0.52 23 
Middle East and North Africa 0.35 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.46 16 
North America 0.40 0.04 0.11 0.37 0.43 2 
South Asia 0.36 0.04 0.12 0.29 0.43 8 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.43 0.08 0.18 0.31 0.67 45 
       
World 0.39 0.05 0.13 0.25 0.67 167 
Average Gini across countries, 2008-2017. To calculate regional averages, we first calculated the average Gini index 
for each country in the period 2008- 2017 and then we produced an average across countries in each region. Source: 
elaborations from UNU-WIDER (December 2018). 
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Figure 1. Missing Gini during the Colonial Period in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
  
Source: elaboration from UNU-WIDER (December 2018). 
 
This situation, however, could be overcome by making good use of the information available in 
colonial archives. While, generally speaking, such information does not allow us to reconstruct 
complete distributions of income and/or wealth, it allows us to build social tables of sufficiently 
high quality and detail. Social tables divide the population of a given country or society into more 
or less homogenous groups or “classes”, and provide information about the size (number of 
individuals or households) and the average income of each class. As a method to study economic 
inequality, they are fairly popular, especially when more detailed information about the actual 
distributions is missing. This is particularly true for colonial Senegal and Ivory Coast, for which tax 
tabulation records did not survive. The first known example of a social table is Gregory King’s A 
scheme of the income, and expense, of the several families of England; calculated for the year 1688 (see 
Lindert and Williamson 1983), but many more recent social tables have also been produced. 
Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2011) as well as Milanovic (2018), for example, made an 
extensive use of this methodology in their seminal articles on inequality extraction4 and more 
recently, social tables have become a popular tool in the study of long-term inequality trends in 
preindustrial Asian (Saito 2010; 2015) and European (Scheidel and Friesen 2009; Broadberry et al. 
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2015; Milanovic 2017; Allen 2019) societies, mainly due to their high comparability and relative 
ease of construction (see Alfani 2019b for a commented synthesis). Social tables have also been 
elaborated to study inequality in a few British colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Kenya 
(Bigsten 1987), Botswana (Bolt and Hillbom 2016), and Ghana (Aboagye and Bolt 2018). 
In order to estimate inequality with acceptable precision, social tables should strive to follow two 
principles. First, overlap between classes should be limited as much as possible (i.e., every individual 
from a lower class should be poorer than any individual from a higher class). Otherwise, social tables 
will tend to overestimate inequality. Second, classes should be homogenous, i.e. inequality within each 
class should be minimal. If this is not true, inequality will tend to be underestimated, as it would only 
include inequality between classes and not within. Although these two principles might seem somewhat 
contradictory, the practical solution (which is in line with both principles) is to build social tables as 
detailed and disaggregated as is allowed by the available data. To these two guiding principles, we will 
add a third: the division in classes must make sense, based on the historical context, for the societies 
under study. In other words, it should reflect meaningful characteristics of such societies and their real 
socio-economic stratification. In the following paragraphs, we detail the statistical sources we used to 
build our social tables for French West Africa, as well as the methods we used to estimate size and 
average income for each class composing such tables. 
 
Data 
 
To reconstruct income distributions, we mainly use information from two editions of the Annuaire 
Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale (1949; 1955). These yearbooks were published by the Service 
de la Statistique Générale of French West Africa and include a wealth of information on climate, 
population, production (agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forest, industries, and mines), transport, 
imports and exports, prices and wages, and public finance. Overall, the yearbooks are the expression 
of the efforts that the colonial governments had made since the 1930s to provide a detailed picture 
of the economic and social situation of the colonies. The first volume of the Annuaire Statistique de 
l’Afrique Occidentale was published in 1936 and covered the years 1933-34. Two other volumes 
were published in 1937 and 1939, by the Service de la Statistique Générale de la France and the 
Ministry of Colonies. After the establishment of the Service Colonial de Statistique in 1943, local 
statistical offices were created in most territories. In 1945, the first statistical office of French West 
Africa was established in Dakar. This institution undertook the enormous task of gathering and 
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standardizing all the reports and statistical documents which had been produced by each territory. 
The main fruits of these efforts were three new volumes of Annuaire Statistiques, published in 1950 
(covering 1939-49), in 1955 (covering 1950-54), and in 1957 (covering 1955-56). By using 
information in these Annuaires Statistiques, we construct social tables every five years from 1939 
to 1954 for Ivory Coast and Senegal. In total, eight different social tables are elaborated to evaluate 
income inequality in French West Africa.5 
 
Definition of classes 
 
To reconstruct income distributions, we divide the population of each colony into an active and an 
inactive class. The active class is then subsequently divided between farmers and wage workers. 
We further categorize wage earners according to their occupation: heads of firms and colonial 
administrators, employees, skilled workers, and unskilled workers. The first subcategory includes 
European governors and high-level administrators of the colonies, African chiefs, and heads of firms 
and plantation owners. Employees include administrative staff, public and private sector employees 
in agriculture, forestry, mining, industry, transport, public works, and commerce. Skilled workers 
include army, police, and technical and qualified workers in both public and private sector. 
Unskilled workers are laborers and apprentices. Moreover, each subclass can be composed of either 
Africans or Europeans. 
We divide African farmers into four sub-classes: subsistence farmers, lower-class commercial 
farmers, middle-class commercial farmers, and rural elite. The main activity of subsistence farmers 
is small scale agriculture which simply covers the household’s needs. Lower-class farmers engage 
in commercial agriculture, but they do not own land. They instead rent it from a class of larger land-
owner (the rural elite) in exchange for a share of the crop. Middle-class farmers own land and receive 
income from sales of agricultural production. The rural elite’ income is derived from both direct 
sales of own production and the share obtained from the land rented to the lower class. 
While we have information at colony level only for wage workers and subsistence farmers, for 
commercial farmers we are able to gather data at the district level. In total, we have 40 distinct 
classes in Senegal and 25 distinct classes in Ivory Coast, a number which is significantly higher than 
                                                 
5 Our social tables focus on labor and land income inequality. Other components of capital income are impossible to 
measure given the available information and are not included in the analysis, while land rents are estimated for the 
African rural elite. 
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in previous studies on African inequality based on social tables: 5 for Kenya (Bigsten 1987), 8 for 
Botswana (Bolt and Hillbom 2016), and 17 for Ghana (Aboagye and Bolt 2018). 
 
Population 
 
The first step to construct social tables is to estimate the total population. Colonial publications 
report the number of Africans and Europeans living in the colonies. We estimate the European 
population at the colony level, starting from information in 1936, 1945, 1948, 1951, and 1955 
available in the Annuaire Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale. We obtain population figures for our 
four benchmark-years by interpolation using the growth rate of European population in each colony. 
As the Europeans were a very small percentage of the population (1-2%), extending the analysis to 
the district level makes little sense. 
For the African population instead, we need data at the district level. We estimate population for 11 
districts in Senegal and 16 districts in Ivory Coast, by using population estimates in 1948 and 1955 from 
the Annuaire Statistique and interpolating with each the growth rate of each district in order to obtain 
population figures for our four benchmark years. Since population estimates from colonial 
publications tend to be biased downwards (at least for the African component), we correct our 
figures. Specifically, we increase the population of each district proportionally to the ratio between 
the sum of the population of all districts as reported in the colonial yearbooks and the more precise 
estimate of population provided by Frankema and Jerven (2014), excluding Europeans. We compute 
a different ratio for every year and we then apply it to all districts. On average, the corrected 
population estimates are between 20% and 30% larger than the original ones. 
From population totals, we identify the active population by subtracting children (less than 15 years 
old), elderly (above 65), and unemployed from the total population of both Africans and Europeans 
in each year. In 1951, the European active population is reported to be 52% of the total number of 
Europeans in Senegal and 59% in Ivory Coast. We use the same ratios to estimate the European 
inactive population in other years. Similarly, we estimate 54% of the total African population to be 
active. We obtain these estimates by using the World Bank (2018) estimates for 1960 of 43.5% of 
children and 2.5% of elderly people. Applying these percentages to other years is justified by the 
fact that they are very stable over time (e.g. the percentage of children in Senegal is 44% in 1960 
and 43% in 2017). Obviously, it is likely that in the African context children started working at a 
much younger age than 15. However, we can assume that they gave a marginal contribution to their 
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parents’ income and we do not consider them as individual earners in the income distribution (i.e. 
the income produced by working children just increases their parents’ income). In the same way, 
the assumption that elderly do not receive any income is a strong one, but, given their very low 
population share, this is unlikely to affect the results significantly. The last assumption that we make 
is that all African adults work, which is reasonable as most of the population engaged in at least 
some subsistence farming. 
 
Wage workers 
 
To estimate the size of the wage-earner classes, we start with data from 1947 and 1954. For 1947, 
colonial publications report numbers of African employees, skilled, and unskilled workers for both 
Senegal and Ivory Coast. To include also the top wage category of heads of firms/colonial 
administrators, we use their proportion relative to all other wage workers at the federation level and 
we apply it to both our colonies, for Europeans and Africans. For 1954, colonial publications report 
the number of Senegalese wage workers in the private sector for each of the four sub-classes in 
1954. To include public sector workers, we increase each category by applying, for Europeans and 
Africans separately, the average proportion of public vs. private sector workers in the whole of 
French West Africa, by job category. For Ivory Coast, we have information on the total number of 
African and European workers, but we lack direct information on the number of workers in each 
sub-category. To solve this problem, we estimate them by applying the proportion of French West 
Africa to the total number of African and European workers in Ivory Coast. Finally, to estimate the 
number of workers in each category in 1939, 1944, and 1949, we compute the proportion of each 
category with respect to the active population in each colony for Africans and for Europeans in 1947 
and 1954 and apply them to total active population figures in the other years. We use 1947 for 1939 
and 1944 and we use the average of 1947 and 1954 for 1949.  
Colonial publications report the average salary of each wage earner category. We transform all 
hourly or daily wages into monthly wages, by using information from the Annuaires Statistiques  
indicating a 40-hour / 5-day work-week after 1953 and a 48-hour / 6-day work-week before then.6 
In case of missing data, we proceed in the following way. If available, we use ratios of wages in 
other French colonies, keeping the year and origin (Africans vs Europeans) constant. The reason for 
                                                 
6 These assumptions are similar to those used in Frankema and Van Vaijenburg (2012)’s analysis of real wages in British 
Africa (25-26 working days per month and 48-54 hours per week with a six-day week). 
13  
doing so is that we want to correctly compare the level of inequality across years and origin, before 
comparing it across colonies. For example, to estimate the wage of African employees in Senegal 
in 1939, we compute the ratio of the employees’ wage vs. skilled workers’ wage in Ivory Coast in 
1939 and multiply it by the wage of Senegalese skilled workers in the same year. Alternatively, we 
use information from the same colony and year, but different origin. For example, the wages of 
African heads of firms are computed by applying the wage ratio of heads of firms vs. employees 
and skilled workers among Europeans to the wage of African employees and skilled workers in each 
colony and year. Overall, we estimate in this way 21 out of 56 cases (2 colonies x 7 
African/European /job category x 4 years). 
 
Farmers 
 
We estimate the number of farmers as the difference between active population and total number of 
wage workers. To divide farmers into sub-classes, we exploit two sources of variation, across and 
within districts. First, we use differences in land productivity and value of crops suitable for 
cultivation to measure variation in income across districts. Second, we rely on qualitative sources 
to identify the class structure in each district and measure variation in income within each district. 
More specifically, we proceed in the following way. First, we estimate the rural African active 
population of each district by subtracting the active urban population, as reported by the Annuaires 
Statistiques, from the total active African population in each district. To estimate urban population, 
we interpolate with district-specific growth rates computed on data from 1945 and 1955. 
Second, for each district, we estimate the number of people working in commercial agriculture based 
on the total number of hectares cultivated. The Annuaires Statistiques report cultivated hectares for 
each crop in each district in 1954 and 1949-1950. We interpolate data to get estimates of cultivated 
land for the other years. Assuming 0.8 hectares per worker in Senegal and 1.4 hectares in Ivory 
Coast, we estimate the total number of commercial farmers in each district and year. The estimate 
of hectares per worker in Senegal is derived from a 1960-61 agricultural survey finding an average 
of 1.5 ha per capita (Diarassouba 1968), which implies 0.8 ha per worker assuming an active 
population share of 54%. This estimate is also confirmed by Bosc et al. (2018, p.185), who report a 
current estimate of 0.82 ha per working member. For Ivory Coast, we use Rassam (1990) estimate 
of 5-10 ha per farm in the early 1980s, which, assuming 10 members per household (USAID Land 
and Urban Office, 2017) and a 54% active share, implies an average of 1.4 ha per worker. To make 
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sure that we are not overestimating the number of commercial farmers, we subtract the land 
cultivated by seasonal migrant laborers, the so-called navetanes in Senegal. Their number was 
significant, ranging from 21 to 81 thousand workers in our period. They were almost exclusively 
employed in the cultivation of peanuts. We gather information on the total number of migrant 
workers at the colony level from Péhaut (1961) and David (1980, p. 461) and we interpolate to 
estimate the missing years. Then we redistribute them across districts, proportionally to each 
district’s share of the total value of peanut production. 
Third, we compute the total value of agricultural production in each district. As the name of districts 
changed over time, we reconstructed areas for which we can get consistent information. For Senegal, 
data are available in 1954 and 1949 on total quantities produced in each of 11 districts for 8-9 main 
crops. We compute the total value of production by multiplying each quantity by the corresponding 
price in Dakar. For 1944 and 1939 we only have production values for peanuts. We then estimate 
total district value by applying the share of value from peanuts, the main Senegal commodity, in 
1949-54 to peanut production in 1944 and 1939. For districts that did not produce peanuts (3 out of 
11), we interpolate back the production values in 1949 by using the colony’s average growth rate. 
For Ivory Coast, we have information on total production in 1954, 1949 and 1944 for 16 districts 
and 13-17 commodities. If a commodity is not reported in any one year, we estimated it by using 
the share of this commodity in the next year in which it is reported and applying it to the total value 
of commodities reported in both years. By using prices in Abidjan, we compute the total value of 
production in each district. For 1939, we estimate district values by applying the colony growth rate 
of agricultural production between 1939 and 1944 to each district’s value in 1939. 
Fourth, since not all productions are reported at the district level (e.g. livestock), we increase district 
production by using the ratio total colony level production / total production reported by districts. 
Farmers’ income is thus increased on average by 60% in Senegal and by 110% in Ivory Coast. 
Colonial statistics report colony-level production for the main agricultural commodities (12 
different crops in Senegal and 23 in Ivory Coast). Each crop could be produced for local 
consumption (food crop), destined for export (cash crop), or both. However, sometimes only 
commercialized production is recorded. To take into account the entire production, we increase by 
1/3 food-cash crops for which only the commercialized part is reported, and we increase by 100 
times food crops for which only the commercialized part is reported.7 In some cases, specific 
                                                 
7 We derive these estimates from a few cases in which we have both the production for consumption and the production 
for export. 
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commodities are not reported in every year. To estimate missing data, we construct an index of the 
yearly variation of the total agricultural production and apply it to the production of that commodity 
in the closest year for which we have information. Total livestock production is computed from 
slaughterhouse data, which report the total number of heads of cattle which are slaughtered.  For 
each category of animals (cows, pigs, goats), we take the average weight and the proportion of the 
edible part to compute the amount of meat which is produced. Total fish production is also included. 
Agricultural total income is then computed by multiplying the total production of each item by its 
price in Dakar or Abidjan. Missing prices for some commodities/years are estimated by applying an 
index of general price variation to years for which we have information. 
Fifth, after computing the value of the production by using prices in Dakar or Abidjan, we evaluate 
it at rural prices, by applying the ratio of farm-gate to urban prices from a sample of commodities 
(66% in Senegal, 48% in Ivory Coast). The choice between urban or rural prices is not 
straightforward. Evaluating farmers’ income at urban prices would facilitate comparison of standard 
of living between urban and rural workers, taking into account the different cost of living between 
cities and countryside. On the other hand, evaluating production with farm gate prices might be 
better in order to estimate the farmers’ purchasing power of imported goods, such as textiles. 
Finally, we compute the income of the average farmer in each district by dividing the total 
production value by the total number of commercial farmers. As we do not divide classes by gender, 
we are not concerned by the risk of including inactive women in the farmers class, thus 
underestimating the farmers’ income. Both (inactive) men and women are included in the inactive 
population class. Note that, although it is true that farmers generated part of their income from 
activities other than farming or animal husbandry, such as handicraft, this was a very small portion 
of their total income.8 
Having estimated average income differences across districts, we turn our analysis to differences 
within each district. Following the Ethnographic Atlas (Murdock 1967), we classify African ethnic 
groups into three main categories, according to their social structure: complex, dual, and egalitarian 
ethnic groups. Complex and dual ethnic groups have one lower non-landowning class and one 
higher land-owing class (‘nobles /free men’). The lower class pays a “tax” (share of crop) to a subset 
of the higher class – which we define ‘elite’ for clarity- in exchange for the rights to cultivate land 
(Sow 1992, Bloch 1993). Among ethnic groups without class structure, land is owned equally 
                                                 
8 For example, a 1944 budget for a family belonging to the Wolof - the main ethnic group of Senegal- lists only agriculture 
and livestock as sources of income (Diop 1971, p. 98). 
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among households. In complex groups, ‘nobles /free men’ constitute “a large majority of the 
population” (Conrad and Frank 1995). In dual groups, the ‘nobles’ are fewer: among the Soninké, 
for example, an ethnic group classified as dual, 40% of the populations are ‘nobles/free men’ (Boch 
1993). The main part of the ‘tax’, e.g. the waref among the Wolof (Lagacé and Skoggard 1999, Salau 
2010) or the diaka among the Soninké, usually amounts to 10% of the value of crop (Bloch 1993). Several 
other payments might also be required: for example, among the Soninké, the ninagumankande (a small 
crop share paid to the landowner), the muso (a variable crop share), and the debigumankande (a small 
crop share paid to the village chief) (Boch 1993). 
To estimate income differences within districts, we first identify the main ethnic groups residing 
there. In Senegal most ethnic groups are either dual or complex, while Ivory Coast has a more 
egalitarian social structure. The Wolof, the main ethnic group of Senegal, accounting for almost 40% 
of the population (CIA 2019), are a complex ethnic group. Their three main classes are the geer /free 
men, who are farmers and religious and political leaders and constitute most of the population, the neeno, 
an artisan class, and the lower class of jaam, a servile class, both without land rights (Gomez 2002, pp. 
24-25; Irvine 1978, Thiam 2013, pp. 98-99). Other main ethnic groups are the Fula (about 25% of the 
population), the Serer (15%), and the Mandinka (5%), all classifiable as dual groups, and the Jola/Diola 
(5%), characterized by an egalitarian social structure (CIA 2019, Murdock 1967). 
In Ivory Coast, the Mandes (20% of the population, CIA 2019), living in the north-west (Northern 
Mandes, e.g. Malinke) and in the west (Southern Mandes, e.g. Tourandan) are a dual ethnic group. Their 
social structure is composed of two main classes: the higher class Horon (nobles/freemen), farmers and 
shepherds, and the lower class Jonow, descendants of slaves (Hoffman 2001, p. 280). The largest ethnic 
group of Ivory Coast, the Akan, living in the east-center region of the country and accounting for almost 
30% of the population (CIA 2019), can instead be classified as an egalitarian society (based on 
information on the Baoulé, the largest Akan group, from the Ethnographic Atlas). Voltaique groups (15% 
of the population) in the north-center and northeast, such as the Senufo, and Kru groups (10% the 
population) in the south-west, and the remaining ethnic groups, can also be classified as egalitarian.  
Having identified the main ethnic groups in each district, we estimate the size of elite, middle-class, 
and lower class, and we increase or reduce their income proportionally to the “tax”. Following 
anthropological and historical records, we estimate the size of the elite and middle-class as 40% of 
the population in dual groups and 67% of the population in complex groups. The rest of the 
population is assigned to the lower class. To estimate the size of the elite subset of the upper class, 
we use information on land distribution in Senegal in 1960-61 (Diarassouba 1968) to estimate how 
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many land-owning households are necessary to provide the land rented by the lower class. In doing 
so, we first compute the total population belonging to the lower class (43% of the population of 
Senegal in 1954). Assuming a minimum of 0.5 ha per farmer, the lower class requires 158 thousand 
hectares. The top category of households (owning more than 15 ha) are 2.5% of the population and, 
assuming a minimum of 2.4 ha per household (0.5 ha/worker x 9 members per household x 54% 
active share), they have 184 thousand ha available to rent. We can thus estimate that land is rented 
from the top 86% of the richest households (158/184=86%), which is equivalent to 2.2% of the 
population (86%*2.5%). The tax is estimated at 20% of the crop value. Members of the lower class 
receive then 80% of the average income, members of the middle class receive the average income, 
and members of the elite receive 3.8 times the average income in complex ethnic groups and 6.25 
times in dual groups. In this way, the elite’s income includes land rents. 
To evaluate per capita income for European farmers, we use data from Ivory Coast reporting the 
total production from European cocoa and coffee plantations. We compute European farmers 
income by dividing the total value of such production by the total number of European farmers, 
which we obtain by subtracting wage workers from the estimates of European active population. 
The average European farmer made about 5.3 times more than the average African farmer. We use 
this proportion and information on African average farming income to estimate European farmers’ 
income in Senegal. 
The difference between total rural active population and commercial farmers is included in the 
subsistence farmers category. To measure their income, we use a subsistence basket approach. We 
use the basket from table 2 of Frankema and Van Waijenburg (2012), but we increase the quantity 
of the staple crop to reach 2100 calories per basket. The cheapest staple crop was maize or millet in 
Senegal and cassava in Ivory Coast.  
 
4. Results 
 
Tables 2 to 9 show our social tables. Before discussing income distribution, let us point out some 
basic descriptive statistics. Senegal and Ivory Coast were characterized by relatively small 
populations: about 2.1 million people in 1939 and 2.9 million in 1954. In our period of analysis, 
more than 90% of the population worked in agriculture. Europeans accounted only for a small 
minority, ranging from 0.8% to 1.4% of the total population in Senegal and from 0.2% to 0.4% in 
Ivory Coast. In Senegal, on average 24% of European workers were employed in the top category 
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as colonial administrators or heads of firms (14% in Ivory Coast), compared to only 0.1% of African 
workers. The vast majority of Africans (around 95% of all workers) were either farmers or employed 
as unskilled workers. Subsistence farmers made about one fifth of working population in Senegal 
in 1939 and declined to just 2% in 1954. In Ivory Coast, their number is constant around one third 
of the working population. 
To evaluate income differences among classes and their evolution over time, we compute welfare 
ratios by dividing the income by the value of the subsistence basket described in the previous 
section. In 1939, among African wage workers welfare ratios ranged from 4.5 to 25.0 in Senegal 
and from 3.4 to 23.6 in Ivory Coast, depending on the job category. By 1954, welfare ratios tended 
to decline for the top wage category (18.4 in Senegal and 23.2 in Ivory Coast), while they increased 
for unskilled workers (5.2 in Senegal and 6.1 in Ivory Coast). On average, the wage of the top 
category was about 4.5 times that of the unskilled workers in Senegal and 5.2 times in Ivory Coast. 
In terms of skill premium, the wage of unskilled workers was about 40% of the skilled wage. 
Commercial lower and middle-class farmers tended to be poorer than wage workers. In Senegal, 
lower-class African farmers produced enough to afford from a minimum of 1.0 to a maximum of 
2.6 subsistence baskets depending on the district in 1939, but by 1954 their welfare ratios had 
declined to the 1.0-1.7 range. Middle-class farmers enjoyed higher welfare ratios of 1.0 to 4.5 in 
1939, but they also saw their standard of living decline over time reaching the 1.0-2.1 range in 1954. 
Welfare ratios of the rural elite were substantially higher: 4.5-20.1 in 1939 declining to 1.7-13.3 in 
1954. In Ivory Coast, farmers tended to be richer and class distinctions are relevant only in a few 
districts. On average in 1939 commercial farmers produced 1.0 to 19.2 subsistence baskets, 
depending on the location. Contrary to what happened in Senegal, their income increased over time, 
reaching welfare ratios of 3.4-28.1 in 1954.  
European wage workers enjoyed much higher welfare ratios than Africans in 1939, ranging from 
167.9 to 354.9 in Senegal and from 150.4 to 335.0 in Ivory Coast. Ratios declined over time, 
reaching 42-133 in Senegal and 47-86 in Ivory Coast in 1954, but remained much higher than those 
of Africans.  
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Table 2. Income distribution in Senegal, 1939 
 
  people 
monthly 
income 
(francs 
CFA) 
household 
adjusted-
monthly 
income  
share 
workers 
share 
income 
welfare 
ratio 
       
African administrators/heads of firms 705 1,068 288 0.07% 0.35% 25.0 
African employees 10,408 875 236 0.97% 4.29% 20.4 
African skilled workers 13,204 505 136 1.23% 3.14% 11.8 
African unskilled workers 37,539 192 52 3.50% 3.40% 4.5 
       
African rural elite       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 572 248 130 0.05% 0.07% 5.8 
Diourbel 2,119 772 404 0.20% 0.77% 18.0 
Kaolack 4,912 849 444 0.46% 1.96% 19.8 
Kédougou 401 268 140 0.04% 0.05% 6.3 
Linguère 223 861 450 0.02% 0.09% 20.1 
Louga 1,529 498 260 0.14% 0.36% 11.6 
Matam 1,786 459 240 0.17% 0.39% 10.7 
Podor 855 435 227 0.08% 0.18% 10.2 
Tambacounda-Bakel 676 460 240 0.06% 0.15% 10.7 
Thiès 3,475 345 181 0.32% 0.57% 8.1 
Ziguinchor 1,044 194 101 0.10% 0.10% 4.5 
       
African rural middle class       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 16,856 65 34 1.57% 0.52% 1.5 
Diourbel 36,415 123 65 3.40% 2.12% 2.9 
Kaolack 84,403 136 71 7.88% 5.39% 3.2 
Kédougou 6,892 43 22 0.64% 0.14% 1.0 
Linguère 3,833 138 72 0.36% 0.25% 3.2 
Louga 45,038 131 69 4.20% 2.78% 3.1 
Matam 30,679 73 38 2.86% 1.06% 1.7 
Podor 14,691 70 36 1.37% 0.48% 1.6 
Tambacounda-Bakel 19,913 121 63 1.86% 1.13% 2.8 
Thiès 102,356 91 48 9.55% 4.38% 2.1 
Ziguinchor 46,404 194 101 4.33% 4.24% 4.5 
       
African rural lower class       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 8,584 52 27 0.80% 0.21% 1.2 
Diourbel 57,802 99 52 5.40% 2.69% 2.3 
Kaolack 133,973 109 57 12.51% 6.85% 2.5 
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Kédougou 10,939 43 22 1.02% 0.22% 1.0 
Linguère 6,084 110 58 0.57% 0.32% 2.6 
Louga 22,936 105 55 2.14% 1.13% 2.4 
Matam 48,697 59 31 4.55% 1.35% 1.4 
Podor 23,319 56 29 2.18% 0.61% 1.3 
Tambacounda-Bakel 10,141 97 51 0.95% 0.46% 2.3 
Thiès 52,126 73 38 4.87% 1.79% 1.7 
       
African subsistence farmers 201,497 43 22 18.81% 4.06% 1.0 
       
European administrators/heads of firms 1,848 15,182 7,062 0.17% 13.22% 354.9 
European employees 3,513 12,439 5,786 0.33% 20.59% 290.7 
European skilled workers 2,364 7,184 3,342 0.22% 8.00% 167.9 
European farmers 575 606 282 0.05% 0.16% 14.2 
       
African inactive 1,003,745 0 0    
European inactive 7,662 0 0       
Sources: elaborations from Annuaire Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale Française 1949-51 and 1950-1953 and other 
sources (see text). 
 
 
Table 3. Income distribution in Senegal, 1944 
 
  people 
monthly 
income 
(francs 
CFA) 
household 
adjusted-
monthly 
income  
share 
workers 
share 
income 
welfare 
ratio 
       
African administrators/heads of firms 777 1,752 423 0.07% 0.22% 10.3 
African employees 11,472 1,260 304 0.99% 2.33% 7.4 
African skilled workers 14,554 994 240 1.25% 2.33% 5.9 
African unskilled workers 41,378 326 79 3.56% 2.17% 1.9 
       
African rural elite       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 779 644 337 0.07% 0.08% 3.8 
Diourbel 2,275 1,061 555 0.20% 0.39% 6.3 
Kaolack 5,460 4,058 2,123 0.47% 3.57% 23.9 
Kédougou 524 1,061 555 0.05% 0.09% 6.3 
Linguère 434 1,061 555 0.04% 0.07% 6.3 
Louga 1,671 914 478 0.14% 0.25% 5.4 
Matam 1,691 1,774 928 0.15% 0.48% 10.5 
Podor 1,141 1,412 738 0.10% 0.26% 8.3 
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Tambacounda-Bakel 837 1,665 871 0.07% 0.22% 9.8 
Thiès 3,693 928 485 0.32% 0.55% 5.5 
Ziguinchor 2,043 848 443 0.18% 0.28% 5.0 
       
African rural middle class       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 22,933 170 89 1.97% 0.63% 1.0 
Diourbel 39,094 170 89 3.37% 1.07% 1.0 
Kaolack 93,820 649 339 8.08% 9.80% 3.8 
Kédougou 9,011 170 89 0.78% 0.25% 1.0 
Linguère 7,455 170 89 0.64% 0.20% 1.0 
Louga 49,206 241 126 4.24% 1.91% 1.4 
Matam 29,052 284 148 2.50% 1.33% 1.7 
Podor 19,610 226 118 1.69% 0.71% 1.3 
Tambacounda-Bakel 24,645 438 229 2.12% 1.74% 2.6 
Thiès 108,762 244 128 9.36% 4.27% 1.4 
Ziguinchor 90,817 848 443 7.82% 12.39% 5.0 
       
African rural lower class       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 11,679 170 89 1.01% 0.32% 1.0 
Diourbel 62,054 170 89 5.34% 1.69% 1.0 
Kaolack 148,921 519 271 12.82% 12.44% 3.1 
Kédougou 14,304 170 89 1.23% 0.39% 1.0 
Linguère 11,833 170 89 1.02% 0.32% 1.0 
Louga 25,059 192 101 2.16% 0.78% 1.1 
Matam 46,114 227 119 3.97% 1.68% 1.3 
Podor 31,127 181 94 2.68% 0.90% 1.1 
Tambacounda-Bakel 12,551 351 183 1.08% 0.71% 2.1 
Thiès 55,388 195 102 4.77% 1.74% 1.2 
       
African subsistence farmers 148,319 170 89 12.77% 4.05% 1.0 
       
European administrators/heads of firms 2,515 21,590 10,043 0.22% 8.74% 127.3 
European employees 4,780 15,890 7,391 0.41% 12.23% 93.7 
European skilled workers 3,217 11,875 5,524 0.28% 6.15% 70.0 
European farmers 782 2,087 971 0.07% 0.26% 12.3 
       
African inactive 1,127,615 0 0    
European inactive 10,426 0 0       
Sources: elaborations from Annuaire Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale Française 1949-51 and 1950-1953 and other 
sources (see text). 
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Table 4. Income distribution in Senegal, 1949 
 
  people 
monthly 
income 
(francs 
CFA) 
household 
adjusted-
monthly 
income  
share 
workers 
share 
income 
welfare 
ratio 
       
African administrators/heads of firms 1,630 10,413 2,440 0.13% 0.82% 19.5 
African employees 13,056 7,039 1,650 1.04% 4.42% 13.2 
African skilled workers 23,377 5,961 1,397 1.85% 6.70% 11.2 
African unskilled workers 46,521 3,037 712 3.69% 6.79% 5.7 
       
African rural elite       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 447 2,108 1,102 0.04% 0.05% 3.9 
Diourbel 2,410 7,952 4,159 0.19% 0.92% 14.9 
Kaolack 6,005 10,033 5,247 0.48% 2.90% 18.8 
Kédougou 275 3,343 1,749 0.02% 0.04% 6.3 
Linguère 572 3,343 1,749 0.05% 0.09% 6.3 
Louga 1,817 4,841 2,532 0.14% 0.42% 9.1 
Matam 1,594 5,733 2,998 0.13% 0.44% 10.7 
Podor 1,255 4,161 2,176 0.10% 0.25% 7.8 
Tambacounda-Bakel 1,031 3,413 1,785 0.08% 0.17% 6.4 
Thiès 3,855 2,994 1,566 0.31% 0.55% 5.6 
Ziguinchor 3,615 962 503 0.29% 0.17% 1.8 
       
African rural middle class       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 13,153 555 290 1.04% 0.35% 1.0 
Diourbel 41,404 1,271 665 3.28% 2.53% 2.4 
Kaolack 103,169 1,604 839 8.18% 7.95% 3.0 
Kédougou 4,725 535 280 0.37% 0.12% 1.0 
Linguère 9,829 535 280 0.78% 0.25% 1.0 
Louga 53,532 1,274 666 4.24% 3.28% 2.4 
Matam 27,386 917 479 2.17% 1.21% 1.7 
Podor 21,556 665 348 1.71% 0.69% 1.2 
Tambacounda-Bakel 30,377 898 470 2.41% 1.31% 1.7 
Thiès 113,555 788 412 9.00% 4.30% 1.5 
Ziguinchor 160,710 962 503 12.74% 7.43% 1.8 
       
African rural lower class      0.0 
Dakar-Bas Senegal 6,698 535 280 0.53% 0.17% 1.0 
Diourbel 65,721 1,017 532 5.21% 3.21% 1.9 
Kaolack 163,760 1,283 671 12.99% 10.10% 2.4 
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Kédougou 7,500 535 280 0.59% 0.19% 1.0 
Linguère 15,601 535 280 1.24% 0.40% 1.0 
Louga 27,262 1,019 533 2.16% 1.34% 1.9 
Matam 43,469 733 384 3.45% 1.53% 1.4 
Podor 34,217 535 280 2.71% 0.88% 1.0 
Tambacounda-Bakel 15,470 719 376 1.23% 0.53% 1.3 
Thiès 57,829 630 330 4.59% 1.75% 1.2 
       
African subsistence farmers 120,879 535 280 9.59% 3.11% 1.0 
       
European administrators/heads of firms 3,700 46,550 21,653 0.29% 8.28% 87.1 
European employees 5,977 31,467 14,637 0.47% 9.04% 58.9 
European skilled workers 3,578 26,649 12,396 0.28% 4.58% 49.9 
European farmers 2,572 5,907 2,748 0.20% 0.73% 11.1 
       
African inactive 1,253,709 0 0   0.0 
European inactive 14,610 0 0     0.0 
Sources: elaborations from Annuaire Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale Française 1949-51 and 1950-1953 and other 
sources (see text). 
 
 
Table 5. Income distribution in Senegal, 1954 
 
  people 
monthly 
income 
(francs 
CFA) 
household 
adjusted-
monthly 
income  
share 
workers 
share 
income 
welfare 
ratio 
       
African administrators/heads of firms 2,574 13,696 3,981 0.18% 1.14% 18.4 
African employees 20,077 9,625 2,798 1.40% 6.27% 12.9 
African skilled workers 41,605 7,510 2,183 2.91% 10.15% 10.1 
African unskilled workers 74,639 3,856 1,121 5.22% 9.34% 5.2 
       
African rural elite       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 1,157 2,835 1,483 0.08% 0.11% 3.8 
Diourbel 2,580 6,950 3,635 0.18% 0.58% 9.3 
Kaolack 6,692 9,959 5,209 0.47% 2.16% 13.3 
Kédougou 618 7,469 3,906 0.04% 0.15% 10.0 
Linguère 704 4,667 2,441 0.05% 0.11% 6.3 
Louga 2,028 4,682 2,449 0.14% 0.31% 6.3 
Matam 1,536 5,971 3,123 0.11% 0.30% 8.0 
Podor 1,302 5,822 3,045 0.09% 0.25% 7.8 
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Tambacounda-Bakel 1,286 3,051 1,596 0.09% 0.13% 4.1 
Thiès 4,041 3,506 1,834 0.28% 0.46% 4.7 
Ziguinchor 5,312 1,273 666 0.37% 0.22% 1.7 
       
African rural middle class       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 34,076 746 390 2.38% 0.83% 1.0 
Diourbel 44,325 1,111 581 3.10% 1.60% 1.5 
Kaolack 114,977 1,592 833 8.04% 5.94% 2.1 
Kédougou 10,623 1,194 625 0.74% 0.41% 1.6 
Linguère 12,098 746 390 0.85% 0.29% 1.0 
Louga 59,729 1,232 644 4.18% 2.39% 1.7 
Matam 26,396 955 499 1.85% 0.82% 1.3 
Podor 22,363 931 487 1.56% 0.68% 1.2 
Tambacounda-Bakel 37,886 803 420 2.65% 0.99% 1.1 
Thiès 119,014 923 483 8.32% 3.56% 1.2 
Ziguinchor 236,125 1,273 666 16.51% 9.76% 1.7 
       
African rural lower class       
Dakar-Bas Senegal 17,354 746 390 1.21% 0.42% 1.0 
Diourbel 70,357 889 465 4.92% 2.03% 1.2 
Kaolack 182,503 1,274 666 12.76% 7.55% 1.7 
Kédougou 16,862 955 500 1.18% 0.52% 1.3 
Linguère 19,203 746 390 1.34% 0.47% 1.0 
Louga 30,418 986 516 2.13% 0.97% 1.3 
Matam 41,898 764 399 2.93% 1.04% 1.0 
Podor 35,497 746 390 2.48% 0.86% 1.0 
Tambacounda-Bakel 19,294 746 390 1.35% 0.47% 1.0 
Thiès 60,609 746 390 4.24% 1.47% 1.0 
       
African subsistence farmers 31,565 746 390 2.21% 0.76% 1.0 
       
European administrators/heads of firms 5,664 64,500 30,002 0.40% 11.86% 86.4 
European employees 5,723 45,327 21,084 0.40% 8.42% 60.7 
European skilled workers 2,434 35,369 16,452 0.17% 2.80% 47.4 
European farmers 6,983 6,252 2,908 0.49% 1.42% 8.4 
       
African inactive 1,406,136 0 0    
European inactive 19,205 0 0       
Sources: elaborations from Annuaire Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale Française 1949-51 and 1950-1953 and other 
sources (see text). 
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Table 6. Income distribution in Ivory Coast, 1939 
  people 
monthly 
income 
(francs 
CFA) 
household 
adjusted-
monthly 
income  
share 
workers 
share 
income 
welfare 
ratio 
       
African administrators/heads of firms 769 823 546 0.07% 0.44% 23.6 
African employees 5,688 610 405 0.50% 2.44% 17.5 
African skilled workers 7,766 369 245 0.69% 2.02% 10.6 
African unskilled workers 53,245 117 78 4.70% 4.38% 3.4 
       
African rural elite       
Abengourou 381 485 253 0.03% 0.13% 13.9 
Abidjan 756 637 333 0.07% 0.34% 18.2 
Grand Bassam -Aboisso 618 448 234 0.05% 0.19% 12.8 
Agboville 626 165 86 0.06% 0.07% 4.7 
Bondoukou 597 35 18 0.05% 0.01% 1.0 
Bouaké 1,967 133 70 0.17% 0.18% 3.8 
Daloa 480 669 350 0.04% 0.23% 19.2 
Dimbokro 2,028 102 53 0.18% 0.15% 2.9 
Gagnoa 799 207 108 0.07% 0.12% 5.9 
Grand Lahou 996 66 34 0.09% 0.05% 1.9 
Katiola 947 35 18 0.08% 0.02% 1.0 
Man 455 254 133 0.04% 0.08% 7.3 
Korhogo-Odienne 2,408 35 18 0.21% 0.06% 1.0 
Sassandra 316 67 35 0.03% 0.01% 1.9 
Séguéla 603 308 161 0.05% 0.13% 8.8 
Tabou 238 35 18 0.02% 0.01% 1.0 
       
African rural middle class       
Abengourou 16,932 485 253 1.49% 5.77% 13.9 
Abidjan 33,628 637 333 2.97% 15.05% 18.2 
Grand Bassam -Aboisso 27,476 448 234 2.43% 8.65% 12.8 
Agboville 27,810 165 86 2.45% 3.23% 4.7 
Bondoukou 26,530 35 18 2.34% 0.65% 1.0 
Bouaké 87,454 133 70 7.72% 8.18% 3.8 
Daloa 21,331 669 350 1.88% 10.03% 19.2 
Dimbokro 90,140 102 53 7.96% 6.47% 2.9 
Gagnoa 35,511 207 108 3.13% 5.16% 5.9 
Grand Lahou 44,281 66 34 3.91% 2.05% 1.9 
Katiola 42,086 35 18 3.71% 1.03% 1.0 
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Man 13,400 73 38 1.18% 0.69% 2.1 
Korhogo-Odienne 107,028 35 18 9.45% 2.63% 1.0 
Sassandra 14,026 67 35 1.24% 0.66% 1.9 
Séguéla 17,769 89 47 1.57% 1.11% 2.5 
Tabou 10,565 35 18 0.93% 0.26% 1.0 
       
African rural lower class       
Man 6,824 53 28 0.60% 0.26% 1.5 
Séguéla 9,049 65 34 0.80% 0.41% 1.9 
       
African subsistence farmers 416,818 35 18 36.79% 10.23% 1.0 
       
European administrators/heads of firms 210 11,697 9,138 0.02% 1.73% 335.0 
European employees 513 8,674 6,777 0.05% 3.13% 248.5 
European skilled workers 156 5,250 4,102 0.01% 0.58% 150.4 
European farmers 1,706 800 625 0.15% 0.96% 22.9 
       
African inactive 936,432 0 0    
European inactive 1,797 0 0       
Sources: elaborations from Annuaire Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale Française 1949-51 and 1950-1953 and other 
sources (see text). 
 
 
Table 7. Income distribution in Ivory Coast, 1944 
  people 
monthly 
income 
(francs 
CFA) 
household 
adjusted-
monthly 
income  
share 
workers 
share 
income 
welfare 
ratio 
       
African administrators/heads of firms 837 1529 830 0.07% 0.24% 9.4 
African employees 6,194 995 540 0.51% 1.16% 6.1 
African skilled workers 8,457 744 404 0.69% 1.18% 4.6 
African unskilled workers 57,984 299 162 4.75% 3.26% 1.8 
       
African rural elite       
Abengourou 373 989 517 0.03% 0.07% 6.1 
Abidjan 936 2,079 1,087 0.08% 0.37% 12.8 
Grand Bassam -Aboisso 673 1,660 868 0.06% 0.21% 10.2 
Agboville 706 591 309 0.06% 0.08% 3.6 
Bondoukou 776 162 85 0.06% 0.02% 1.0 
Bouaké 2,737 387 203 0.22% 0.20% 2.4 
Daloa 721 1,798 940 0.06% 0.24% 11.1 
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Dimbokro 2,158 388 203 0.18% 0.16% 2.4 
Gagnoa 909 734 384 0.07% 0.13% 4.5 
Grand Lahou 1,061 250 131 0.09% 0.05% 1.5 
Katiola 982 162 85 0.08% 0.03% 1.0 
Man 591 219 114 0.05% 0.02% 1.3 
Korhogo-Odienne 3,054 162 85 0.25% 0.09% 1.0 
Sassandra 359 238 124 0.03% 0.02% 1.5 
Séguéla 893 244 127 0.07% 0.04% 1.5 
Abengourou 235 162 85 0.02% 0.01% 1.0 
       
African rural middle class       
Abengourou 16,561 989 517 1.36% 3.08% 6.1 
Abidjan 41,602 2,079 1,087 3.41% 16.27% 12.8 
Grand Bassam -Aboisso 29,930 1,660 868 2.45% 9.35% 10.2 
Agboville 31,384 591 309 2.57% 3.49% 3.6 
Bondoukou 34,488 162 85 2.82% 1.05% 1.0 
Bouaké 121,692 387 203 9.96% 8.87% 2.4 
Daloa 32,065 1,798 940 2.63% 10.84% 11.1 
Dimbokro 95,929 388 203 7.85% 7.00% 2.4 
Gagnoa 40,426 734 384 3.31% 5.58% 4.5 
Grand Lahou 47,144 250 131 3.86% 2.22% 1.5 
Katiola 43,648 162 85 3.57% 1.33% 1.0 
Man 17,420 219 114 1.43% 0.72% 1.3 
Korhogo-Odienne 135,757 162 85 11.11% 4.14% 1.0 
Sassandra 15,967 238 124 1.31% 0.71% 1.5 
Séguéla 26,316 244 127 2.15% 1.21% 1.5 
Tabou 10,469 162 85 0.86% 0.32% 1.0 
       
African rural lower class       
Man 8,871 159 83 0.73% 0.27% 1.0 
Séguéla 13,401 177 93 1.10% 0.45% 1.1 
       
African subsistence farmers 364,389 162 85 29.83% 11.11% 1.0 
       
European administrators/heads of firms 276 21,590 16,867 0.02% 1.12% 133.2 
European employees 673 14,050 10,976 0.06% 1.78% 86.7 
European skilled workers 205 10,500 8,203 0.02% 0.41% 64.8 
European farmers 2,239 2,675 2,090 0.18% 1.13% 16.5 
       
African inactive 1,032,622 0 0    
European inactive 2,358 0 0       
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Sources: elaborations from Annuaire Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale Française 1949-51 and 1950-1953 and other 
sources (see text). 
 
 
Table 8. Income distribution in Ivory Coast, 1949 
  people 
monthly 
income 
(francs 
CFA) 
household 
adjusted-
monthly 
income  
share 
worker
s 
share 
income 
welfar
e ratio 
       
African administrators/heads of 
firms 1,297 9,458 4,732 0.10% 0.49% 19.8 
African employees 9,851 6,393 3,199 0.74% 2.51% 13.4 
African skilled workers 16,994 4,586 2,295 1.28% 3.11% 9.6 
African unskilled workers 63,920 1,958 980 4.80% 4.99% 4.1 
       
African rural elite       
Abengourou 363 14,112 7,381 0.03% 0.20% 29.5 
Abidjan 1,026 8,595 4,495 0.08% 0.35% 18.0 
Grand Bassam -Aboisso 731 8,038 4,204 0.05% 0.23% 16.8 
Agboville 794 3,004 1,571 0.06% 0.10% 6.3 
Bondoukou 915 1,296 678 0.07% 0.05% 2.7 
Bouaké 2,924 1,429 747 0.22% 0.17% 3.0 
Daloa 783 2,697 1,410 0.06% 0.08% 5.6 
Dimbokro 2,293 1,583 828 0.17% 0.14% 3.3 
Gagnoa 1,033 2,720 1,423 0.08% 0.11% 5.7 
Grand Lahou 952 2,181 1,141 0.07% 0.08% 4.6 
Katiola 1,017 478 250 0.08% 0.02% 1.0 
Man 715 3,014 1,576 0.05% 0.09% 6.3 
Korhogo-Odienne 3,203 478 250 0.24% 0.06% 1.0 
Sassandra 408 1,352 707 0.03% 0.02% 2.8 
Séguéla 966 2,040 1,067 0.07% 0.08% 4.3 
Tabou 232 478 250 0.02% 0.00% 1.0 
       
African rural middle class       
Abengourou 16,121 14,112 7,381 1.21% 9.08% 29.5 
Abidjan 45,617 8,595 4,495 3.43% 15.65% 18.0 
Grand Bassam -Aboisso 32,480 8,038 4,204 2.44% 10.42% 16.8 
Agboville 35,305 3,004 1,571 2.65% 4.23% 6.3 
Bondoukou 40,657 1,296 678 3.06% 2.10% 2.7 
Bouaké 130,004 1,429 747 9.77% 7.41% 3.0 
Daloa 34,789 2,697 1,410 2.61% 3.74% 5.6 
Dimbokro 101,921 1,583 828 7.66% 6.44% 3.3 
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Gagnoa 45,910 2,720 1,423 3.45% 4.98% 5.7 
Grand Lahou 42,333 2,181 1,141 3.18% 3.69% 4.6 
Katiola 45,201 478 250 3.40% 0.86% 1.0 
Man 21,060 871 456 1.58% 0.73% 1.8 
Korhogo-Odienne 142,369 478 250 10.70% 2.72% 1.0 
Sassandra 18,145 1,352 707 1.36% 0.98% 2.8 
Séguéla 28,466 590 308 2.14% 0.67% 1.2 
Tabou 10,324 478 250 0.78% 0.20% 1.0 
       
African rural lower class       
Man 10,725 635 332 0.81% 0.27% 1.3 
Séguéla 14,496 429 225 1.09% 0.25% 0.9 
       
African subsistence farmers 398,272 478 250 29.94% 7.60% 1.0 
       
European administrators/heads of 
firms 784 46,550 36,367 0.06% 1.46% 97.4 
European employees 1,270 31,467 24,584 0.10% 1.60% 65.8 
European skilled workers 442 26,649 20,820 0.03% 0.47% 55.7 
European farmers 3,270 11,875 9,277 0.25% 1.55% 24.8 
       
African inactive 1,136,096 0 0    
European inactive 4,007 0 0       
Sources: elaborations from Annuaire Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale Française 1949-51 and 1950-1953 and other 
sources (see text). 
 
 
Table 9. Income distribution in Ivory Coast, 1954 
  People 
monthly 
income 
(francs 
CFA) 
household 
adjusted-
monthly 
income 
share 
workers 
share 
income 
welfare 
ratio 
       
African administrators/heads of firms 2,635 11,226 6,244 0.17% 0.62% 23.2 
African employees 20,552 8,301 4,617 1.31% 3.55% 17.1 
African skilled workers 42,591 6,398 3,559 2.71% 5.68% 13.2 
African unskilled workers 76,407 2,944 1,637 4.86% 4.69% 6.1 
       
African rural elite       
Abengourou 377 7,956 4161 0.02% 0.06% 16.4 
Abidjan 585 8,935 4673 0.04% 0.11% 18.4 
Grand Bassam -Aboisso 852 6,775 3543 0.05% 0.12% 14.0 
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Agboville 858 3,524 1843 0.05% 0.06% 7.3 
Bondoukou 1,697 3,294 1723 0.11% 0.12% 6.8 
Bouaké 3,809 4,548 2378 0.24% 0.36% 9.4 
Daloa 1,084 3,017 1578 0.07% 0.07% 6.2 
Dimbokro 1,705 5,095 2665 0.11% 0.18% 10.5 
Gagnoa 853 3,778 1976 0.05% 0.07% 7.8 
Grand Lahou 619 4,841 2532 0.04% 0.06% 10.0 
Katiola 737 3,483 1822 0.05% 0.05% 7.2 
Man 1,527 10,910 5706 0.10% 0.35% 22.5 
Korhogo-Odienne 3,874 1,731 905 0.25% 0.14% 3.6 
Sassandra 236 2,998 1568 0.01% 0.01% 6.2 
Séguéla 1,323 13,619 7123 0.08% 0.38% 28.1 
Tabou 47 1,640 858 0.00% 0.00% 3.4 
       
African rural middle class       
Abengourou 16,744 7,956 4161 1.06% 2.78% 16.4 
Abidjan 25,987 8,935 4673 1.65% 4.84% 18.4 
Grand Bassam -Aboisso 37,871 6,775 3543 2.41% 5.34% 14.0 
Agboville 38,142 3,524 1843 2.43% 2.80% 7.3 
Bondoukou 75,441 3,294 1723 4.80% 5.18% 6.8 
Bouaké 169,334 4,548 2378 10.77% 16.04% 9.4 
Daloa 48,201 3,017 1578 3.07% 3.03% 6.2 
Dimbokro 75,795 5,095 2665 4.82% 8.04% 10.5 
Gagnoa 37,932 3,778 1976 2.41% 2.99% 7.8 
Grand Lahou 27,524 4,841 2532 1.75% 2.78% 10.0 
Katiola 32,763 3,483 1822 2.08% 2.38% 7.2 
Man 44,990 3,154 1649 2.86% 2.96% 6.5 
Korhogo-Odienne 172,198 1,731 905 10.95% 6.21% 3.6 
Sassandra 10,479 2,998 1568 0.67% 0.65% 6.2 
Séguéla 38,973 3,937 2059 2.48% 3.20% 8.1 
Tabou 2,096 1,640 858 0.13% 0.07% 3.4 
       
African rural lower class       
Man 22,911 2,297 1201 1.46% 1.10% 4.7 
Séguéla 19,847 2,867 1500 1.26% 1.19% 5.9 
       
African subsistence farmers 505,252 485 253 32.13% 5.10% 1.0 
       
European administrators/heads of 
firms 2,084 64,500 50391 0.13% 2.80% 133.1 
European employees 2,106 47,694 37261 0.13% 2.09% 98.4 
European skilled workers 896 36,762 28721 0.06% 0.69% 75.9 
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European farmers 2,570 20,432 15963 0.16% 1.09% 42.2 
       
African inactive 1,317,312 0 0    
European inactive 5,320 0 0    
Sources: elaborations from Annuaire Statistique de l’Afrique Occidentale Française 1949-51 and 1950-1953 and other 
sources (see text). 
 
Social tables can be used to produce measures of overall inequality. We compute two different Gini 
measures. The first one refers to the distribution of income among individual income earners (hence 
excluding the inactive), while the second one considers differences in household composition 
between classes (including the inactive, who are assigned to households in which at least some 
members were active: see below). The individual Gini allows us to compare our results with the 
literature on pre-independence African inequality which focused on this indicator (Bolt and Hillbom 
2016). The household-adjusted Gini allows for comparisons with the estimates available from UNU-
WIDER (2018), which uses household data, and to obtain consistent long-run series of inequality 
measures.  
To produce our estimates we consider three types of households: African farmers, African wage 
workers, and Europeans. For each household type, colony, and year, we divide each worker’s 
income by a coefficient which takes into account the household composition. To compute this 
coefficient, we estimate the average number of dependents (children, elderly, and other inactive 
people) that each worker needs to provide for. For example, among African rural households, each 
adult worker needs to provide on average for 0.81 children and 0.05 elderly. Then, given Allen’s 
(2015) assumptions of four consumption baskets for a family of two adults and two children (i.e. 
3160 calories per adult male, 2057 calories per woman, and 1591 calories per children) we give a 
weight of 1.25 to each adult and of 0.75 to each child. The four-year average coefficient for African 
farmer households is 1.9, the one for African wage workers is 3.9 in Senegal and 1.8 in Ivory Coast, 
and the one for European households is 2.1.  
Table 10 shows Gini indexes for the colonies under analysis in the two decades before 
independence, from 1939 to 1954. Considering the distribution among income earners, Senegal had 
the highest level of inequality, with a Gini index ranging from about 0.62 to 0.49.9 Ivory Coast, on 
the other hand, shows Gini indexes from 0.57 to 0.47. Household-adjusted Gini indexes range from 
                                                 
9 The Gini index has been standardized to vary between values 0 and 1. A value of 0 corresponds to perfect equality, 
i.e. all individuals have the same income, while 1 corresponds to perfect inequality, i.e. one individual earns the entire national 
income. 
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0.59 to 0.45 in Senegal and from 0.59 to 0.49 in Ivory Coast. Looking at the trend between 1939 
and 1954 we observe that inequality tends to decline in both colonies and at both the individual and 
the household level. 
 
 Table 10. Gini, 1939-1954 
  Individuals household-adjusted 
 Senegal Ivory Coast Senegal Ivory Coast 
1939 0.62 0.57 0.59 0.59 
1944 0.53 0.49 0.52 0.50 
1949 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.56 
1954 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.49 
Sources: calculations from tables 2-9. 
 
While Gini indexes give us an overall measure of inequality, we can obtain a much more precise 
picture of income distribution by looking at income shares. Table 11 shows the results. The richest 
5% of individual earners received on average 44% of total income in Senegal and 27% in Ivory 
Coast, while the poorest quartile only 7%. In Senegal, the richest quartile got relatively poorer over 
time with their share of income declining between 1939 and 1954, while all three poorest quartiles 
became relatively richer. In Ivory Coast instead, both top and bottom quartile became relatively 
poorer to the advantage of the middle-class. This suggests that different forces might be at play in 
explaining the reduction of inequality during the late colonial period in the two colonies: an increase 
in the standard of living of the bottom half of the population in Senegal and an improvement in the 
conditions of the middle-class in Ivory Coast. 
 
Table 11. Income Shares 
a. Individual Incomes 
       
  top 5% top 10% IV quartile III quartile II quartile I quartile 
Senegal       
1939 54% 60% 70% 14% 10% 6% 
1944 38% 46% 65% 17% 10% 8% 
1949 40% 47% 61% 17% 13% 8% 
1954 42% 52% 64% 15% 12% 9% 
 
 
  
 
  
Ivory Coast       
1939 32% 49% 70% 16% 7% 7% 
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1944 26% 43% 64% 17% 10% 9% 
1949 31% 47% 67% 20% 6% 6% 
1954 19% 30% 54% 28% 14% 4% 
       
b. Household-Adjusted Incomes 
       
  top 5% top 10% IV quartile III quartile II quartile I quartile 
Senegal       
1939 51% 57% 68% 15% 11% 6% 
1944 40% 46% 63% 18% 11% 8% 
1949 34% 40% 55% 21% 14% 10% 
1954 37% 45% 58% 18% 14% 10% 
 
 
  
 
  
Ivory Coast       
1939 32% 53% 71% 15% 7% 7% 
1944 28% 44% 64% 18% 9% 9% 
1949 33% 48% 68% 19% 7% 6% 
1954 22% 33% 55% 31% 10% 4% 
Sources: calculations from tables 2-9.  
 
In any case, with the household-adjusted Gini ranging from 0.45 to 0.59, it is undeniable that 
inequality in the colonial period was very high, especially considering that today’s average world 
Gini is 0.39. We explore two possible explanations for this phenomenon. The first is that the high 
inequality depended on income differentials between the modern urban sectors of the society and 
the traditional rural sector. The second is that it depended on the much higher standards of living of 
European settlers with respect to those of the African majority. 
Table 12 explores the rural-urban income gap. Overall, it was larger in Senegal than in Ivory Coast. 
In both colonies, wageworkers accounted for less than 7-8% of the working population and received 
44% of income in Senegal and 15% of income in Ivory Coast. Senegalese urban workers received 
about six times their proportional income share, while in Ivory Coast they received only twice their 
proportional share – a difference that can be attributed to the smaller number of highly paid 
European workers in Ivory Coast. In short, even though we observe an income gap between wage 
earners and farmers, this does not seem to be large enough to account for the very high levels of 
inequality that we find in both colonies. Interestingly, this is generally true also for post-colonization 
societies, as suggested by a study of a group of Sub-Saharan African countries in the 1980s and 
early 1990s (Cogneau et al. 2007, pp. 27-28). This study includes Ivory Coast where in 1985-88, 
even though the income ratio of non-agricultural to agricultural households was 2.4, inequality 
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between farmers and the rest accounted for no more than 15% of overall inequality (decomposition 
obtained by means of Theil index: see later). 
 
Table 12. Inequality between Wage Workers and Farmers: The Share of Wage Workers 
 
  share workers 
share 
income 
share income/ 
share workers 
Senegal    
1939 6.5% 53.0% 8.2 
1944 6.8% 34.2% 5.0 
1949 7.8% 40.6% 5.2 
1954 10.7% 50.0% 4.7 
    
Ivory Coast    
1939 6.0% 14.7% 2.4 
1944 6.1% 9.1% 1.5 
1949 7.1% 14.6% 2.1 
1954 9.4% 20.1% 2.1 
Sources: calculations from tables 2-9. 
 
Another possibility is that high inequality came from the income differential between Africans and 
Europeans. Table 13 explores this hypothesis. In Ivory Coast, Europeans were between 0.2% and 
0.5% of the working population and received between 4% and 7% of total income (on average 18 
times their proportional share). In Senegal, inequality was even larger: despite accounting for only 
0.8-1.5% of the working population, European settlers received from 23% to 42% of the total 
income (on average 29 times their proportional share). 
 
Table 13. Inequality between Europeans and Africans: The Share of Europeans 
 
  share workers 
share 
income 
share income/ 
share workers 
Senegal    
1939 0.8% 42.0% 54.2 
1944 1.0% 27.4% 28.2 
1949 1.3% 22.6% 18.0 
1954 1.5% 24.5% 16.8 
    
Ivory Coast    
1939 0.2% 6.4% 28.0 
1944 0.3% 4.4% 16.0 
1949 0.4% 5.1% 11.7 
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1954 0.5% 6.7% 13.7 
Sources: calculations from tables 2-9. 
 
One might wonder whether this huge income differential came from Europeans’ employment in 
more lucrative professions with respect to Africans. Indeed, about one fourth of Europeans worked 
as colonial administrators or heads of firm, compared to just 0.1% of African workers. It is unclear 
whether this pattern depended on the difference in education and skills between Africans and 
Europeans or on the fact that the colonial economy offered better job opportunities to European 
workers. However, even though it is true that the proportion of Europeans with high-paying jobs 
was higher than the proportion of Africans, wage gaps existed at all levels. Table 14 shows that 
within the same occupation, the wages of Europeans were between 5 and 14 times higher than those 
of Africans. Other sources from the secondary literature confirm this finding: Europeans received 
higher wages and benefits in both the private and the public sector (Berg 1957). 
 
Table 14. Ratio of European vs African Wages 
 
 1954 1949 1944 1939 
Senegal 4.7 4.5 12.3 14.2 
Ivory Coast 5.7 4.9 14.1 14.2 
Reported ratios are the average of ratios of European and African wages within the same job category.  
Sources: calculations from tables 2-9. 
 
The Europeans, however, were few and this somewhat limited the potential impact of African-
European wage differentials on overall inequality levels. To explore this further, we made use of 
Theil indexes, which can be perfectly decomposed into “between” and “within” group inequality. 
Thus, they allow us to discover whether, for example, changes in inequality levels were shaped by 
changes in the number of Europeans in the colonies (as Europeans earned much larger wages, 
inequality is expected to increase/reduce in unison with their prevalence in the overall population), 
or by changes in inequality “within” Europeans or Africans.10 In Figure 2, we charter the trends of 
the Theil indexes and of its components: B.G.I. (Between Group Inequality) and W.G.I. (Within 
Group Inequality). The latter is further subdivided into the contribution to W.G.I. of the Africans 
and the Europeans respectively. So for example, in 1939 Senegal a B.G.I. of 1.34 and a W.G.I. of 
0.16 (0.12 due to inequality among the Africans, and 0.04 among the Europeans) added up to a Theil 
                                                 
10 For examples of the use of the Theil index to study inequality in past societies, see Alfani (2010) and Santiago-Caballero 
(2011). About the characteristics of the Theil index, see Shorrocks (1980; 1984).  
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index of 1.5. By 1954 the composition of inequality had significantly changed. While W.G.I. 
remained almost unchanged at 0.2 (0.14 among Africans, 0.06 among Europeans), the B.G.I. had 
declined dramatically, to 0.52. The different components added up to a Theil of 0.73, much lower 
than that found in 1939.  
 
Figure 2. Inequality Decomposition: Theil indexes 
 
a. Senegal 
 
 
b. Ivory Coast 
 
Sources: calculations from tables 2-9, using household-adjusted incomes. 
 
In Senegal, then, the overall decline in inequality in the period 1939-54 was mostly due to a 
reduction in Between Group Inequality. This is the combined consequence of the reduction in the 
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ratio of European to African wages (Table 14) and of the related reduction in the share of income 
absorbed by the Europeans, which counter-balances a certain increase in their prevalence (Table 
13). This process seems to connect with a progressive change in the nature of the European (mostly 
French) presence in the colony. In fact, since the 1930s, political movements in France and in the 
colonies had begun to demand better conditions for workers and after World War 2 the colonial 
governments tended to employ less extractive policies, for example by abolishing forced labor 
(Cooper 1996; Fall 1993).  
While, generally speaking, this story also relates to the Ivory Coast, there in the late colonial period 
inequality between Africans and Europeans was never the largest component of overall inequality. 
It was, instead, within the Africans that we find the main forces for inequality decline, with a 
contribution to the W.G.I. declining from 0.54 to 0.28 during 1939-54. In the same period, in the 
Ivory Coast the B.G.I. (which was much lower than in Senegal to begin with) declined only by a 
fifth, from 0.25 to 0.2. Indeed, after having touched a minimum of 0.14 in 1944 and 1949, in the 
Ivory Coast the B.G.I. grew again during 1949-54, which is coherent with a share of income earned 
by Europeans that reached the maximum observed value in 1954 (at 6.7%: compare Table 13). 
Notwithstanding these important differences in the dynamics affecting Senegal and Ivory Coast, it 
must be underlined that in both colonies over time inequality within the Africans tended to become 
more and more important to define overall inequality levels. This provides a hint about the 
underlying causes of the processes which occurred in the following decades, as discussed in the next 
section. 
 
5. Discussion: Inequality Extraction and Extractive Institutions 
 
The significance of the time trends which we reconstructed for the period 1939-54 can be fully 
understood only if we place them into a broader perspective. This means not only assessing the 
potential impact of institutions on inequality levels as well as on inequality change in time, but also 
extending our time series to incorporate the most recent observations available.  
 
A Long-Term View on Inequality  
 
In Figure 3, we piece together the Gini indexes computed from our social tables with those available 
in the post-independence period from the UNU-WIDER (2018) database. To be consistent with the 
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more recent estimates, we use household-adjusted Gini. One issue faced when constructing these 
long-terms inequality trends is that for more recent estimates (in Ivory Coast since 1986 and in 
Senegal since 1992), UNU-WIDER reports consumption Gini, while previous estimates and our 
own for the colonial period measure income inequality. To solve this problem, we convert 
consumption Gini into income Gini, by applying the average ratio between these two measures 
computed from a sample of almost 300 countries/year from UNU-WIDER reporting both measures. 
On average, income Gini are about 10% higher than consumption Gini. With these adjustments, we 
uncover a clear tendency towards inequality reduction from colonial times until today. In both 
colonies the Gini index decreased from 0.6 or more in the late 1930s to around 0.45 in the 2010s.  
 
Figure 3. Inequality Trends in The Long-Run 
 
 
 
Sources: calculations from tables 2-9 (using household-adjusted incomes) for 1939-1954 and from UNU-WIDER (2018) 
thereafter. If necessary, Gini indexes are converted to measure income (not consumption) inequality (see text). 
 
  
A first and crucial question to answer is whether this reduction in inequality was an effect of 
independence. This would be coherent with a large part of the literature, which argues that 
Europeans introduced extractive institutions in their African colonies. Considering that in Senegal 
the high level of colonial inequality we measured for 1939 was mostly driven by the income 
differential between Europeans and Africans and that also in the Ivory Coast this was a major 
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component of overall inequality, this might seem a plausible hypothesis. However, our data suggest 
differently. Inequality started to decrease during the colonial period. Both colonies acquired 
independence in 1960, but between 1939 and 1954 the Gini index had already diminished from 0.59 
to 0.45 in Senegal and from 0.59 to 0.49 in Ivory Coast. In both colonies, income inequality between 
Africans and Europeans decreased since the 1930s. In 1939 the share of income of European 
workers in Senegal was 54 times more than their proportional share, while in 1954 it was 17 times. 
In Ivory Coast, this share was 28 times in 1939 and 14 times in 1954 (see table 13). 
As revealed by the decomposition of inequality using the Theil index (Figure 3), Between Group 
Inequality (B.G.I.) declined steadily in this early period. There are good reasons to think that, 
especially in Senegal where B.G.I. was still high in the 1950s, the process of convergence in wages 
between Africans and Europeans continued also in the following years, fueled by independence. 
Additionally, the prevalence of the population with European origins declined. In Senegal, the 
40,010 Europeans were 1.4 % of the total population in 1954. Today, the population with non-
African origins is about as large but this accounts for just 0.3% of an overall population which 
increased seven-fold from 1954, to 13.5 million. However, if truly in Senegal the B.G.I. continued 
to decline after 1960, then a considerable growth in inequality within the Africans must have 
occurred from the same date, given that in this country we find an inversion of the trend in inequality 
(from decline to growth) immediately following independence. 
Our overall conclusion is that while in the pre-independence and (to some degree) in the 
immediately post-independence period the reduction of African-European wage differentials and 
demographic factors (quicker growth of African vs European population) shaped the trend in 
inequality change, in the later period it was affected almost exclusively by inequality change among 
the Africans. It is important to underline this factor, which is not the sole result of the end of 
colonization. As a matter of fact, the original (pre-colonization) African society might have had 
relatively very high inequality levels – especially in areas like the coasts of West Africa, where the 
native population was actively involved in the slave trade and seems to have had relatively 
hierarchical societies with a very uneven distribution of power and access to resources. Slavery was 
a common practice: some estimates report that in the nineteenth century slaves accounted for more 
than one third of the total population of West Africa (Lovejoy 2000). Private enterprise was often 
restricted by the State, e.g. in Asante (Wilks 1979) and Dahomey (Law 1977; Manning 2004), and 
the systems of land allocation based on chiefs generated inefficient ownership structures and limited 
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the possibility of economic development (Goldstein and Udry 2008).11 In other words, it is possible 
that African societies had a relatively marked extractive character, in terms of their ability to 
concentrate resources and redistribute them unequally. This is an aspect on which further research 
would be needed – after all, even for early modern Europe it has been argued that inequality growth 
was due to a significant degree to the development of “extractive” states that redistributed resources 
unequally (Alfani 2015; Alfani and Ryckbosch 2016; Alfani and Di Tullio 2019). Consequently, at 
present we cannot be sure that pre-colonization African states were exceptionally extractive in 
absolute terms, although this seems to be a reasonable hypothesis. 
 
Inequality and Extractive Institutions 
 
Until now, we have used the word “extraction” when referring to institutions allowing to concentrate 
(more or less forcefully) resources in few hands and consequently, to increase inequality. Recently, 
however, the concept of “inequality extraction ratio” has been introduced, which aims to measure 
how much inequality is “extracted” in a society, relative to the maximum feasible inequality which 
can be derived by taking into account that everybody needs to receive subsistence (Milanovic 2006; 
2013; 2018; Milanovic et al. 2011). The maximum feasible inequality increases as a society becomes 
able to generate greater surplus (as reflected in per-capita GDP levels). Formally, 
 
𝐺𝐺∗ = 1 − 𝑠𝑠
𝑚𝑚
 
 
where G* is the maximum attainable Gini, m is the mean income in the economy, and s is the 
subsistence minimum. The inequality extraction ratio (IER) can then be expressed as the ratio 
between the actual measured Gini (G) and G*: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝐺𝐺
𝐺𝐺∗
 
 
While we might expect that the inequality extraction ratios change in unison with inequality levels (as 
measured by Gini indexes), this depends in fact on the relative movement of per-capita GDP (which can 
                                                 
11 The above account of extractive institutions in precolonial Africa is based on James Robinson’s lecture on “Why is Africa 
Poor?”, given at the University of Groningen on April 8, 2013. 
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be used as an estimate of m) and inequality. As shown by recent applications to European history, 
we can have, for example, periods of economic decline coupled with inequality increase and a sharp 
rise of inequality extraction ratios, or trends in inequality change which are similar between 
countries but which correspond to dissimilar trends in inequality extraction ratios (Alfani 2015; 
Alfani and Ryckbosch 2016; Alfani 2019b). 
Sub-Saharan African countries tend to have the double record of being both the most unequal, and 
the most extractive (in terms of inequality extraction ratios) of contemporary societies.12 Surely, the 
countries which today are characterized by exceptionally high inequality extraction ratios are 
concentrated in this area (see Milanovic et al. 2011, pp. 263-4). In Figure 4 we provide these 
measures for our two African states. As can be seen from Figure 4a, inequality extraction ratios 
declined in the post-independence period (with societies moving further away from the Inequality 
Possibility Frontier), but analogously to what we found when analyzing the trend in Gini levels, this 
process began before independence. In Senegal, the inequality extraction ratio was close to the 
frontier in 1939 (83.9%), but on the eve of independence (in 1959) it had declined by almost 14 
percent points (70.3% in 1960) as the result of both a significant reduction of the Gini level (see 
above) and of an increase in per-capita GDP of about 40% from 1939 to 1960. In fact, per-capita 
GDP peaked immediately before independence (1,445 International 1990 GK$13) but declined in 
the second half of the twentieth century, so that inequality extraction ratios stagnated and even grew 
a bit in some phases. Only since the mid-1990s has the process of decline in inequality extraction 
resumed. 
The case of Ivory Coast is only partially similar and is singled out in Figure 4b. Here, too, most of 
the reduction in inequality extraction occurred before independence (obtained in 1960), as in the 
period 1939-59 it declined from 92% to 57.2%. The overall trend was still oriented towards the 
development of a less extractive society in the following decades, with a minimum of 51.1% reached 
in 1989.14 This was mostly due to a large decline in the Gini index (from 0.53 in 1970 to 0.41 in 
1989), as per-capita GDP, which grew in the immediately post-independence decades peaking at 
                                                 
12 Sub-Saharan African countries also tend to have the lowest levels of human development in the world: see Prados de la 
Escosura 2013; 2015. 
13 All the measures of per-capita GDP used throughout the article (including for calculating inequality extraction ratios) come 
from The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version (for details, see Bolt 
and Van Zanden 2014). For Senegal and Ivory Coast before 1950, we used Prados (2012) estimates of per-capita GDP in 
1938 and hypothesized linear change during 1938-50. 
14 The relatively favourable conditions of Ivory Coast in the early 1990s is confirmed by Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps’ study 
of “inequality of opportunity for income” covering a sample of sub-Saharan African countries (Cogneau and Mesplé-Somps 
2008). The data they use for Ivory Coast related to the period 1985-88. 
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2,041 International 1990 GK$ in 1980, has been declining ever since (1,174 International 1990 GK$ 
in 2008). Since the 1990s, overall inequality as measured by the Gini index has been growing again 
(the Gini was 0.48 in 2008). So for about twenty years now, Ivory Coast has been experiencing the 
worst-possible scenario, of growing inequality with declining per-capita income, which has resulted 
in a quickly growing inequality extraction. By 2008, at 64.9%, it was higher than the immediately 
pre-independence level. A recent study of human development in Africa confirms this unfortunate 
halt in the process of social and economic development in Ivory Coast (Prados de la Escosura 2013).  
It would seem plausible to attribute this growth in inequality extraction to the phase of political 
instability triggered by General Robert Guéï’s coup d’état in 1999 and by the two civil wars which 
ravaged the country during 2002-07 and 2010-11. Recently, Milanovic (2013, pp. 20-3) has argued 
that a high inequality extraction ratio is a good predictor of civil war, as it “conveys the information 
about the relative «rapaciousness» of the elite and combines in its formulation two aspects that are 
often found important for the explanation of civil conflict: the average level of development of a 
country (its GDP per capita) and its income distribution” (p. 20). However, the story of Ivory Coast 
does not fit this trend, as there inequality and inequality extraction had been declining, and per-
capita GDP growing, before the beginning of the civil war. Indeed, it seems probable that in this 
country it was civil war itself that inverted the positive tendencies in growth and distribution of GDP 
whose origins can be traced back to colonial times. 
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Figure 4. Inequality Extraction Ratios 
 
a. Ivory Coast and Senegal compared 
  
 
b. The path of Ivory Coast 
 
 
Sources: GINI calculations from tables 2-9 (using household-adjusted incomes) for 1939-54, and from UNI-WIDER (2018) 
thereafter. GDP from Bolt and Van Zanden (2014) and Prados (2012). 
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At least in the two ex-colonies of Ivory Coast and Senegal, it seems that the economic growth which 
occurred in the late period of colonial rule was coupled with processes of distribution of the growing 
income which resulted in an altogether less extractive society. Also, although they were very high, 
the levels of inequality extraction ratios characterizing Ivory Coast and Senegal in the late 1930s 
(92% and 83.9% respectively in 1939) were similar to those found for European societies 
immediately before the onset of the Industrial Revolution. For example, in 1750 the Florentine State 
and the Sabaudian State in Italy had an inequality extraction ratio of 98% and 91% respectively, 
while the southern Low Countries (nowadays Belgium) had 87% (Alfani and Ryckbosch 2016, p. 
4). In these areas, however, inequality extraction ratios had been growing during the early modern 
period (in the Sabaudian State the inequality extraction ratio was “just” 75% ca. 1500). So we need 
to be careful about assuming that the levels of inequality extraction ratios characterizing sub-
Saharan countries in the first half of the twentieth century were “normal” for preindustrial societies 
– indeed, they might have higher than the European norm at comparable levels of economic 
development and standards of living. On this issue, more research is surely needed. 
 
Comparing French Africa to Other Colonies 
 
In the literature on Africa, differences in development paths are often attributed to the identity of 
the colonial power. It has been argued that the British, more aware of the disadvantages of excessive 
exploitation of the colonies, implemented less extractive institutions, while the French made larger 
use of trade monopolies and forced labor practices (Brett 1973; Duignan and Gahan 1975). These 
policies were particularly effective in extracting wealth from the African populations: for example, 
Tadei (2019) finds that thanks to trade monopsonies and labor coercion, the French colonizers were 
able to pay to African agricultural producers much below world market prices. In addition to the 
identity of the colonizer, another important determinant of institutions established by the colonial 
power was the type of colonies. Austin (2010) highlights in particular the distinction between settler 
and peasant colonies. In the first type of territories, Europeans settled in large numbers, expropriated 
land and employed African labor in European-owned plantations. In the second type of colonies 
instead, European presence was much more limited: the land remained mostly in African hands and 
the colonizers focused on trade with the African populations.  
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Can differences in the type of colony or the identity of the colonial power help to interpret our 
findings on inequality and extraction? Our analyses suggested that the income differential between 
Europeans and Africans was a major determinant of inequality, so it seems plausible that the 
distinctions between peasant and settler colonies or between more-extractive French and less-
extractive British have some explanatory power. To give a preliminary answer to this question, we 
compare French Africa with other African colonies. Figure 5 shows the evolution of inequality since 
colonial times in our two French territories (Ivory Coast and Senegal) and in two British colonies 
for which we have information (Kenya and Botswana).15 The comparison with Kenya is particularly 
interesting as it was one of the main examples of settler colonies in Africa, while Senegal, Ivory 
Coast, and Botswana were peasant colonies. 
At the beginning of the period we cover, Kenya had higher levels of inequality, while income 
distributions in Ivory Coast, Senegal, and in particular Botswana were more egalitarian. 
Nevertheless, these colonies experienced different trends. In Senegal and Ivory Coast, inequality 
decreased even during the colonial period. In Kenya, it was stable at high levels from the 1940s to 
the 1960s, and started to decrease only after independence in the 1970s. Botswana, on the other 
hand, experienced an almost continuous increase in inequality. For Kenya, Milanovic et al. (2011, 
pp. 263-4) calculated an inequality extraction ratio of 100% in 1927, which declined to 57.2% by 
1998. The overall decline in inequality extraction during the second half of the twentieth century is 
very similar to that of Senegal, which moved from 83.9% to 58.5% between 1939 and 2001.  
The classic distinction between peasant and settler colonies seems thus to have only limited 
explanatory power: if it can account for the persistence of high inequality in Kenya, a settler colony, 
it is not able to account for the similar inequality extraction ratios in Kenya and Senegal, a peasant 
colony. The identity of the colonial power seems to be even less important: within the same colonial 
empire, Kenya and Botswana follow different paths and even between Senegal and Ivory Coast we 
found relevant (although less dramatic) differences. Overall, this analysis highlights the complexity 
of inequality patterns in colonial Africa. Kenya, a British settler colony in East Africa, followed a 
pattern not too dissimilar from Senegal, a French peasant colony in West Africa. The conclusion is 
that if we want to understand inequality in colonial Africa, we need to adopt more complex and 
context-specific frameworks: exactly as has recently been advocated for Western societies (Lindert 
and Williamson 2016; Alfani 2019a). 
                                                 
15 We use Gini from UNU-WIDER (2015) for Kenya and for Botswana post-1960. For Botswana, in 1921, 1936, 1946, 
1956, we use Ginis published in Bolt and Hillbom (2016), p. 1283.  
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Figure 5. Comparing with Other Colonies 
 
Sources: Senegal and Ivory Coast: calculations from tables 2-9 and UNU-WIDER (2018); Botswana: Bolt and Hillbom 
(2016), appendix IV; Kenya: Bigsten (1987) and UNU-WIDER (2018)’s World Bank estimates. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This study attempted to discover whether the high heterogeneity of income inequality levels in 
modern-day sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the general pattern of high inequality extraction rates, 
has colonial origins. By constructing social tables for Senegal and Ivory Coast during the last 
decades of French rule in West Africa, we found that income inequality was very high in the colonial 
period. Nevertheless, in the last decade of colonial rule inequality tended to decrease over time. By 
using Theil indexes, we uncover that inequality reduction was, in both colonies but especially in 
Senegal, the consequence of changes in the institutional structures of the colonies, reflected in a 
progressive reduction in the African-European wage differentials. However, in the Ivory Coast, the 
main factor leading to inequality decline was the reduction in inequality within the African 
population, as economic growth and the expansion of commercial agriculture provided new 
opportunities for the middle-class. 
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To better understand the significance of our findings, we placed them into a broader picture, both 
chronologically (extending our analysis of inequality changes to the post-colonial period) and 
geographically (comparing our French colonies with the British colonies in Africa for which 
information about inequality in colonial times is available). The use of the concept of the “inequality 
extraction ratio” allowed us to go deeper and to unearth differences in the paths followed by each 
colony which would have been hard to notice, had we relied solely on more traditional measures of 
inequality. We found that independence did not lead to lower inequality – indeed, in Senegal 
independence marked the inversion of the trend in inequality, which from 1960 resumed growing 
rapidly. The Ivory Coast followed the same path from the mid-1960s. But if we look at inequality 
extraction ratios, some improvements in per-capita GDP after independence did allow for these 
African societies to grow less extractive. In the Ivory Coast, political instability and civil wars from 
the late 1990s destroyed these achievements, bringing the country back to levels of development (as 
measured by per-capita GDP) and extractiveness analogous to those found towards the end of the 
colonial period. 
Our overall conclusion is that to fully understand inequality in colonial Africa, as well as the post-
colonial developments, we need to apply complex analytical frameworks – as colonies belonging to 
the same broad categories well established in the literature (for ex., British vs French colony; peasant 
vs settler colony), and even those placed in the same broad geographical area and having the same 
colonial ruler, might have followed very different paths. 
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